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Scholars have argued that the 9/11 attack exposed the presence of a previously unknown global 
menace and their funding structure.1 However, the reality is that national and international 
terrorists have caused casualties over the years, through access to various conduits of financial 
or asset transfers. The bombing of three sites in a five week period in Nairobi, Kenya in 1975, 
the Egypt archaeology site bombing in 1997 and the 1998 United States Embassy bombing in 
Tanzania were all acts of terrorism that could not have been implemented without access to 
funding channels.2 
Given the reality of globalization of terror, it seemed logical that all countries, particularly 
those with unprecedented rates of terrorism, would be consulted in framing regulatory 
responses to curtail the use of financial and non-financial institutions by terrorists. Yet, 
International responses were restricted to input from members of the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), who make up the Group of Seven (G7), the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the emerging economies, including Brazil, India, 
China, Russia and South Africa.3 The FAFT argued that the inclusion of countries not classed 
as ‘strategically important’ would result in expensive and bureaucratic decision making 
processes.4 This foreclosed the participation of all countries in a process that would have 
permitted dissenting viewports. Hence raising concerns as to whether the FATF acknowledged 
that the unsuitability of some of its rules may be uncovered if subject to intense scrutiny – a 
potential catalyst for refutation or delayed transplantation by developing countries.  
Irrespective of this opposing perspective, the FATF has maintained its stance, revealing its 
projection of efficiency over democracy and inclusion, a decision that no doubt had an impact 
on the resulting counter terrorist financing (CFT) standards. These include the 
recommendations to criminalize terror funding and implement standards to curb the 
proliferation of finances through financial institutions or value transfer services, by freezing 
and/or confiscating funds discovered from suspicious transactions.5  
The ensuing CFT standards have proved unsuitable for a majority of countries, particularly 
African states, leading to misguided compliance.6 This can be attributed to two intertwined 
factors: the absence of sturdy pre-conditions for compliance in African states and the lack of 
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legitimacy in the formulation of standards. Political will, well-made legislation, robust legal 
systems and confidence in the regulatory and financial systems are crucial pre-conditions for a 
country’s compliance.7 These factors are lacking in within African states. However, to avert 
sanctions such as financial or economic exclusion due to non-adherence to the CFT standards, 
these countries engage in formal or creative compliance.8 Whilst the former refers to adherence 
to the letter of the law, the latter refers to tactical compliance simply to evade sanctions. 
Consequently, although the FATF’s mutual evaluation reports indicate improved technical 
compliance in certain African countries – these countries have consistently fallen short on the 
effectiveness ratings. This is reinforced by empirical evidence which indicates that no 
correlation exists between the technical compliance levels of African countries to CFT 
standards and their terror levels.9 Thus indicating the possibility of sham compliance levels to 
CFT standards.  
Additionally, a perusal of the CFT standards indicates two presumptions; first  that terror 
funding is usually transferred through financial institutions, and secondly that the informal 
transfer systems such as cash couriers and value transfer services can be regulated in the same 
way as formal institutions.10 Consequently, the FATF empowers regulatory and financial 
institutions to freeze and confiscate terror funding or employ other sanctions, where there is 
financial intelligence indicating that funds are to be utilized for terror activities.11 However, 
this is not always possible in African states, where 76% of the population is unbanked and 25% 
do not have the necessary documentation to open an account.12Furthermore, the existing 
underground banking structure cannot be easily regulated, given its historical development on 
the  basis of communal ‘trust’.13 Terrorists exploit these unregulated avenues for transfer of 
funds because like financial institutions they offer speed and convenience, whilst providing the 
additional cloak of anonymity. This indicates that the CFT standards may be misguided and 
therefore unattainable in a cash based economy, where funds are rarely transferred through 
financial institutions. Africa is still moving away from the barter and cash based system, which 
although considered largely unfitting to the modern capitalist environment – is still prevalent. 
Consequently, the standards aimed at unveiling suspicious transactions may at best be 
inefficient to trace or freeze terror funds that fly under its radar. 
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The narrow focus on banks, coupled with the compliance deficiency of regulatory and financial 
institutions – have brought into question the problem-solving capacity of the FATF to 
effectively address CFT.  
Invariably, there would be pressure on the international community to revisit its non-inclusive 
decision-making process - a proposed solution to ensuring proactive and guided compliance.  
Vibert discounts this solution, arguing that the problem-solving abilities of trans-governmental 
networks (TGNs) such as the FATF, lie not in increased membership but in informed 
knowledge and expertise.14 He believes that amending power relationships in TGNs through 
inclusivity would be inadequate to ensure the effectiveness of the FATF standards or cure the 
existing democratic deficit.15 This position is predicated on the fact that although a select 
number of bodies, such as the International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) 
and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) widened their membership, such changes did not result 
in improved effectiveness or democracy. Consequently, there is the argument that focus should 
be on the ability of these institutions to build their epistemic authority through the 
amalgamation of information and knowledge to help frame regulatory responses.16 Supporting 
this, Kerwer and Hulsee argue that TGNs are objectively technocratic.17 These arguments are 
however limited to the extent that they fail to recognise that improved membership 
representation may indeed be crucial for a more robust knowledge bank at TGNs. 
Consequently, Shaffer argues that the effectiveness of TGNs is dependent on their legitimacy. 
For heuristic purposes, legitimacy is a fluid concept that is not restricted to meaning 
‘conformity to legal rules’.18 Rather, it extends to cover ‘the perception of holding normative 
right to govern by those on whose behalf it seeks to govern’.19 Simply put, an institution is 
legitimate if so perceived. Shaffer argues that the concept inculcates input, throughput and 
output legitimacy. This implies that where, within an institution - all countries have a say in 
formulating standards, are included in the process of decision making and expertise of the 
finalized standards are achieved through deliberations that involve these countries – then it can 
be argued that such an institution is legitimate.  
Legitimacy, which goes beyond ‘membership’ is fundamental in catalyzing proactive 
behavioral responses, a key feature of TGN effectiveness. Proactive compliance transcends 
adherence to the letter of the law, or tactical adherence. Rather, it focuses on pre-empting and 
effectively addressing possible avenues of terror funding. For instance, the response of the 
emerging economies to cryptocurrencies as a conduit for laundering and funding terrorism can 
be classed as proactive – as their stance was taken irrespective of the gap in international 
standards.20Their responses were predicated on their perception of the FATF and their 
membership involvement in contributing to its epistemic community. African countries 
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however fell short of this, with certain countries responding arbitrarily only after pyramid 
schemes built on cryptocurrencies threatened the official financial sector in certain West 
African countries. This can be attributable to their perceived lack of legitimacy within the 
FATF.  
The FATF’s argument that it has secured legitimacy through its interrelationship with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (“Bank”) fails to acknowledge the 
power asymmetries existent in the quota of these institutions, that restrict developing countries 
from having an equal input in decision making processes.  Furthermore, the FATF has 
attempted to cure the ‘illegitimacy’ through the creation of autonomous FATF Styled Regional 
Bodies (FSRB) which granted associate membership to non-members.21 Refuting the viability 
of FSRBs, the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA) stated that although presumably autonomous, it was formed in response to the 
pressure from the blacklisting of Nigeria.22 It only operated based on standards set by the 
FATF, and makes minimal input to these standards.23This has been reiterated by the Eastern 
and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMG), who indicated that its CFT 
laws were only extended in response to the FATF’s CFT standards set after 9/11.24This is 
despite prior terror attacks in Tanzania and Kenya and ongoing attacks in West Africa. No 
doubt, such responses will elicit creative as opposed to proactive compliance occasioned by 
lack of legitimacy. Furthermore, whilst it is postulated that the FSRB granted non-member 
countries associate membership, this is not necessarily the case as it is only the organization 
(FSRB) that gains associate members and not the countries; as countries have no independent 
claim to this position. 
CFT requires that effective regulations match with proactive compliance. Whilst it may be 
argued that the addition of other countries in the deliberation processes of regulatory standards 
may not ensure this, there is no doubt that broadening inclusion would ensure that standards 
deliberate on and inculcate factors previously unconsidered. Such addition would no doubt aid 
the regulation of CFT in the informal sector whilst improving compliance within the formal 
sector. More so, this would confer legitimacy on the FATF – a tool which is indispensable in 
combatting terror funding and propelling proactive compliance.  
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